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ISSUE ADVERTISING, COMMERCIAL
EXPRESSIONS, AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR FIRST
AMENDMENT ADJUDICATION
The increased environmental awareness of the late 1960's and the energy crisis of
the early 1970's led to efforts by many oil,' stee1, 2 lumbers and other companies 4 to use
advertising to inform the public of their anti-pollution actions as well as to discuss their
views on other issues of public concerti," and create good will among consumers." As a
result, in the early 1970's, members of Congress? and commentators 5 increasingly ex-
amined the government's authority to regulate corporate issue advertisement. Their
primary concern was whether the first amendment protected these issue advertisements,
or whether they were a form of commercial speech which, at this time, was wholly
unprotected by the first amendment))
In the 1976 case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer
Council, 10 the Supreme Court re -examined its previous holdings concerning commercial
' See, e.g., "Texaco — 'Putting Aesop to Work,– reprinted in STAFF OF SURCOMM. ON ADMIN.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 95Tif CONG., 211 SESS., SOURCEBOOK ON CORPORATE IMAGE AND CORPO-
RATE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING 44-47 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOKJ (suggestions to
improve automobile mileage); "Shell Oil Company," reprinted in id., at 78-79 ("corporate campaign
aimed at seeding the great grass-roots with good reasons for seeing in Shell a good corporate citizen
and a quality brand name").
2 See, e.g., "U.S. Steel — 'We're Involved,'" reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at '37-39 (U.S.
Steel's involvement with auto safety, the environment, taxes, waste management, and energy).
3 See, e.g., "Weyerhauser Company: Explaining Conservation Concepts," reprinted in SOURCE-
BOOK, supra note 1, at 55 (depicting lumber company as "good steward of its 5.7 million acres of
land while providing leadership in forestry research, regeneration and utilizations programs").
4 The range of companies and issues is very broad. See, e.g., "ITT's approach to Corporate
Advertising," reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, nipr,a note I, at 17-22 (equal opportunity employment,
development of nutritious foods in schools, global art campaign); "Alcoa: 'Focusing on the issues,'"
reprinted in SouRcEsooK, supra note 1, at 52-54 (use of aluminum contributes to conservation of
energy); "Kellogg Company," reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note I, at 76-77 (nutritiousness of
breakfast cereals).
& See, e.g., Petition to FTC of Bayh, McIntyre, Moss, Aspin, Rosenthal, and Young, January 9,
1974, at 3 [hereinafter Petition to Frci, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 1094.
° Petition to FTC, supra note 5, at 5, reprinted in SOURGEBOOK, supra note I, at 1096.
7 See Petition to FTC, supra note 5.
See, e.g., Ludlam, Abatement of Corporate Image Environmental Advertising, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 247
(1974); Note, And Now a Word Against Our Sponsor: Extending the FCC's Fairness Doctrine to Advertising,
60 CALIF. L. RYA,. 1416, 1426-29 (1972); Note, The Regulation of Corporate Image Advertising, 59
MINN. L. REV. 189 (1974).
9 See Ludlam, supra note 8, at 266. Professor Ludlam observed that, "[clentral to any tliscussion
of whether the [Federal Trade] Commission may assert jurisdiction over image advertising is
whether the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech protects these advertisements from
regulation or whether image advertising is a form of 'commercial speech' and thus unprotected by
the first amendment." ld.
For a discussion of commercial speech in the early 1970's, see Note, First Amendment Protection
for Commercial Advertising: l'he New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. Rev. 205,207-22 (1976).
'° 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
981
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speech. After an extensive discussion of the nature and importance of commercial
speech, the Virginia Board Court held that the first amendment protected commercial
speech to some degree." Despite the Supreme Court's re-examination of the law gov-
erning commercial speech, commentators have not re-examined the nature and protec-
tion of corporate issue advertising in light of the Virginia Board decision and its progeny."
The uncertainty of the first amendment protection accorded issue advertisementsL 3
arises because this form of expression shares certain features of both "core" first amend-
ment speech, which concerns matters of public importance, and commercial speech. The
first amendment fosters the free exchange of ideas on matters of public importance, by
freeing speech from undue governmental interference." Courts, therefore, afford broad
protection to speech which falls within the core of the first amendment. 15
Commercial speech also is entitled to some constitutional protection, but a state may
regulate commercial expressions to a greater degree than core first amendment speech. 16
The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as speech solely related to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience," as well as speech which does no
more than propose a commercial transaction.ig Generally, although a state cannot reg-
ulate core first amendment speech because of the content of the speech, a state may
prohibit commercial speech based on its content.I 9
Because issue advertisements may be economically motivated as well as relate to
matters of public concern, courts have treated these expressions inconsistently, depend-
ing upon whether the court stressed the economic motivation of the speaker or the
subject of public concern contained in the speech. Some courts have regarded issue
advertisements as commercial speech and have allowed government regulation, reason-
ing that advertisers should not be permitted to transmit deceptive information. 2° Other
courts, stressing the importance of the advertiser's viewpoint, have viewed issue adver-
tisements as examples of core first amendment speech and accorded them full first
" See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), which granted first amend-
ment protection to commercial speech.
1, See, e.g., the one page discussion of issue advertising in E. ROME & W. ROBERTS, CORPORATE
AND COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH 107 (1985).
13
 In this note, issue advertising is defined as speech by a corporation or other business entity
which describes the entity, its activities, or its views, but does not explicitly propose a commercial
transaction. See infra note 67. See also Ludlam, supra note 8, at 251-52 (1974). On the problem of
defining issue advertising, see Darling, How Companies are Using Corporate Advertising, in SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 1 at 97.
14 See, e.g.,. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 864 (2d ed. 1983).
"See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45.
18 See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) ("qualified but nonetheless
substantial protection accorded commercial speech").
' 7
 See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
18 See, e.g., Virginia State 13d. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976).
19 See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2976-78
(1986) (state may prohibit advertising of casino gambling). See also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564
n.6 ("In most other contexts, the First Amendment prohibits regulation based on the content of
the message. Two features of commercial speech permit regulation of its contents.") (citation
omitted).
" See, e.g., Youngs Drug, 463 U.S. at 66-67.
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amendment protection." The Supreme Court has adopted both approaches at different
times."
This note will examine the courts' inconsistent treatment of issue advertising and
suggest a framework for analyzing and regulating issue advertisements. Section I will
discuss briefly the types of expressions which fall within both core first amendment and
commercial speech. This section will also address the protection accorded both types of
speech." Section II will examine the treatment issue advertising has received in the
courts." Section III will analyze the approaches taken thus far by the courts." Finally,
section IV will suggest a new framework for deciding issue advertising cases. This note
proposes that issue advertising constitutes a unique category of speech. Because issue
advertising shares certain features of both core first amendment speech and commercial
speech, this note proposes a hybrid protection. Under the proposed framework, gov-
ernment may prohibit an advertisement that contains false or deceptive statements of
fact, which the advertiser knows, or should know, are false or deceptive. An advertise-
ment will receive full first amendment protection, however, when it contains statements
of opinion rather than fact, statements that are truthful and nondeceptive, or statements
that the advertiser has no reason to know are false." The proposed framework will
resolve the confusion associated with issue advertising and avoid conceptual and practical
problems inherent in current judicial treatments.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
A. Core First Amendment Speech
The first amendment of the United States Constitution" protects an indi-
vidual's right to self-expression." The Constitution protects this right both in order
to foster the discovery of truth 29 and permit the free and open exchange of
21 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
22 Compare Youngs Drug, 463 U.S. at 67-68 (Supreme Court adopted a motivation-oriented
analysis when condom manufacturer distributed informational pamphlets detailing use of condoms
in preventing venereal disease) with Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776-78 (1978) (Supreme Court adopted
coment-oriented analysis when state sought to prevent Bank from advocating its position on tax
reform).
23 See infra notes 27-65 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 66-128 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 130-44 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 148-64 and accompanying text.
27 The first amendment provides, in relevant part, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech ...." U.S. CoNsr. amend I. The first amendment applies to the states by
incorporation through the fourteenth amendment.. Dillow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
" Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530,
534 n.2. (1980); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978). See also Redish,
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982).
2' Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (The Supreme Court noted
that "jilt is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether by the Government itself or a private licensee"); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (".Those who won our independence) believed that freedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensible to the discovery and spread of
political truth.'').
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ideas." The Constitution especially protects ideas related to political issues" and matters
of public concern."
In order to protect the right of speakers to speak their minds, as well as the right
of listeners to receive as much information and as many different ideas as possible, the
United States Supreme Court subjects state regulation of expression to a "strict scrutiny"
standard of review." Under this standard, a state may not regulate speech unless the
regulation advances a compelling state interest,54 and the means used to regulate the
speech are closely related to advancing that state interest. 35 By adopting this exacting
level of scrutiny, the Court limits a state's ability to infringe first amendment rights. The
strict scrutiny standard affords speech the highest level of constitutional protection.
In addition, although the Supreme Court has concluded that false statements of
fact have no first amendment value,"' the Court nevertheless protects these false state-
ments because it has reasoned that denying such protection would chill valuable speech."
For example, newspapers might be discouraged from publishing true but unverifiable
information if they were subject to libel suits merely upon the showing that a report was
false and injurious to one's reputation. Furthermore, the Court also has adopted the
"overbreadth doctrine" in order to avoid chilling valuable speech."' The overbreadth
doctrine grants standing to challenge a statute or regulation even if the plaintiff cannot
demonstrate that his or her speech was in fact endangered by the statute." The Court's
concern with "chilling" has led it to conclude that a government agency cannot restrain
speech prior to its dissemination, even if it may regulate the same speech after it is
expressed."
Courts thus .afford first amendment speech broad protection from government
regulation because of the speakers' interests in disseminating their messages, as well as
the listeners' interests in receiving their messages. In order to be valid, therefore, any
state regulation of core first amendment speech must withstand strict scrutiny. In addi-
tion, even regulation of false or misleading core first amendment speech must pass the
Court's strict scrutiny standard.
30
 Justice Holmes advanced the "marketplace of ideas" theory for first amendment protection
in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the ultimate good
is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market"). See also Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 537-
38; Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
3j Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776-77; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1, 26 (1971) (only political speech
should be protected by the first amendment).
" Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 534-35; Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940).
" Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
34 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 44-45 (1976); Bates, 361 U.S. at 524.
35 See, e.g., Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 540; Bates, 361 U.S. at 525.
36 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340. In Gertz, the Court observed that "there is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact."
37 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
" See generally Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sm.. CT. REV. 1.
39 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977).
"Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.").
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B. Commercial Speech
The Supreme Court defines commercial speech as speech that does no more than
propose a commercial transaction,'" or speech that relates solely to the economic interests
of the speaker and its audience." Often courts use both definitions together.'" The
Supreme Court also employs a "commonsense distinction," rather than specific criteria,
to determine whether speech is commercial or noncommercial." Generally, if the ad-
vertisement contains any commercial element, courts define the speech as commercial,
regardless of any reference to matters of public concern.'"
The Supreme Court has recognized that although the first amendment protects
commercial speech to some extent, states have greater freedom to regulate commercial
speech.'" The Court allows this greater regulation because it reasons that there is less
" Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 11.9 (1979); Bates, 433 U.S. at 363-64 (1977); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
42 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561; Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v. Attorney
General, 142 Mich. App. 294, 302, 370 N.W.2d 328, 332 (1985).
Commentators have proposed other definitions of commercial speech. See, e.g., Alderman,
Commercial Entities' Noncommercial Speech: A Contradiction in Terms, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 731, 732
(commercial speech should be defined broadly as "any and all speech of a commercial entity");
Comment, Commercial Speech: A I'roposed Definition, 27 How. L.J. 1015, 1027 (1984) (commercial
speech is expression designed primarily to promote a product, service or business interest); Recent
Developments, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,
100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980), 11 ENvrL. L. 767, 782-83 (1981) (commercial speech related to contract
formation).
"In Re National Serv. Corp., 742 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1984); Spiritual Psychic Science
Church v. Azusa, 39 Cal. 3d 501, 510, 703 P.2d 1119, 1123, 217 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229 (1985).
"See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985); Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978);
Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
45 See, e.g., Youngs Drug, 463 U.S. at 68. The Supreme Court stated:
We have made clear that advertising which links a product to a current debate is not
thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech. A
company has the full panoply of protections available to its direct comments on public
issues, so there is no reason for providing similar constitutional protection when such
statements are made in the context of commercial transactions. Advertisers should not
be permitted to immunize false or misleading product informations from government
regulations simply by including references to public issues.
Id. See also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 11.5; American Future Sys. v. Pennsylvania State Univ.,
752 F.2d 854, 860-62 (3d Cir. 1984).
At least one court, however, has taken a contrary view, holding that speech which contains
discussion of matters or public concern in addition to proposing a commercial transaction should
be accorded full first amendment protection. Spiritual Psychic Science Church, 39 Cal. 3d at 511, 703
P.2d at 1123, 217 Cal. Rpm at 229-30. The California Supreme Court stated that:
The principle emerging from these cases is that commercial speech is that which has
but one purpose — to advance an economic transaction. By contrast, noncommercial
speech encompasses activities extending beyond that purpose. For example, an adver-
tisement that cherries can be purchased for a dollar a box at store X may be commercial
speech, but an advertisement informing the public that the cherries for sale at store
X were picked by union workers is more: it communicates a message beyond that
related to the hare economic interests of the parties.
Id.
a See, e.g., Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637. The Court stated that "[t]here is no longer any room to
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danger of chilling speech that proposes commercial transactions because advertisers
generally have the information to determine the truthfulness of their claims'" In addi-
tion, the Court has noted that businesses must advertise their products or services in
order to make a profit and therefore will advertise even if their advertisements are
regulated." Accordingly, the Court applies an intermediate level of scrutiny to state
regulation of commercial speech and allows states to prohibit false or misleading com-
mercial speech. 49 If, however, the speech is not false or misleading, the state must show
that the regulation directly advances a substantial state interest through the least restric-
tive means available 5°
The Supreme Court first granted commercial speech some degree of protection in
the 1976 case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
inc. 51 In finding that commercial speech deserves some first amendment protection, the
Court noted that although the advertiser's interest in expressing itself may be purely
economic, economic motivation alone does not deprive a speaker of its first amendment
protections." Moreover, the Court reasoned that commercial speech that contains infor-
mation concerning the availability of certain products and their prices may be more
important to the listener than discussion of the most pressing political matters." The
Court also observed that in order to maintain an efficient free enterprise system, infor-
mation must flow freely so consumers can make informed decisions about how to spend
their money.54 Thus, the Court concluded that the first amendment protects commercial
speech because of its importance to the listener and society. The speaker's economic
motivation does not, in the Court's view, disqualify the speech from first amendment
protection.
doubt that what has come to be known as 'commercial speech' is entitled to the protection of the
First Amendment, albeit to protection somewhat less extensive than that afforded noncommercial
speech." Id.
17
 See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 584 n.6. The Court noted:
First, commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the market and their
products. Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy and the lawfulness of
the underlying activity. In addition, commercial speech, the offspring of economic
self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not "particularly susceptible to being
crushed by overbroad regulation."
Id. (citations omitted).
4"/d.
45 Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (characterizing majority's four-part test as intermediate
scrutiny).
5° Id. at 564.
5i 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Since Virginia Bd. was decided, an enormous body of literature has been
published concerning commercial speech. See, e.g., Survey of the Literature: Commercial Speech and
Commercial Speakers, 2 CARUOZO L. Rev. 659 (1981) (annotated bibliography).
The historical background of the "new commercial speech" doctrine of Virginia Bd. and its
progeny is well documented. See, e.g., D. BOGEN, BULWARK OF LIBERTY 95-98 (1984); Alderman,
supra note 42, at 732-41; Casenote, Constitutional Law — Commercial Speech — Federal Statute Prohib-
iting Mailing of Unsolicited Contraception Advertisements Violates First Amendment as Applied to Accurate
Mailings That Contribute to Informed Decision Making, Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 103 S.
Ct. 2875 (1983), 14 U. BALT. L. REV 367,368-74 (1985).
4" Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 762. See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,818 (1975); Ginzburg
v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,474 (1966).
53 Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 763.
Id. at 765.
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Despite the Virginia Board Court's conclusion that commercial speech has some first
amendment protection, the Court permitted government regulation of commercial
speech because it determined that the regulation presented minimal danger of "chilling."
The Court noted that because advertising relates to a specific product, claims concerning
the product generally are verifiable, 5 ' Thus, although the Court has tolerated false factual
statements in other first amendment expressions in order to protect the free exchange
of ideas, the Court stated this does not support permitting an advertiser to make false
statements about its own product. 56 The Court also stressed that because businesses must
advertise to make a profit and will advertise even if their advertisements are regulated,
little danger exists that government regulation will chill accurate and nondeceptive
commercial expressions.57 Thus, in Virginia Board, the Court concluded that commercial
speech should be protected because of its value to the listener, but it should be accorded
less rigorous protection because of the minimal danger of chilling this type of speech.
" Id. at 771-72 n.24. The Court noted that:
The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be more easily verifiable by its
disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily
the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service that
he himself provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else.
Id. justice Stewart makes the same argument in his concurrence, noting that "[Once the factual
claims contained in cominercial price or product advertisements relate to tangible goods or services,
they may be tested empirically and corrected to reflect the truth without in any manner jeopardizing
the free dissemination of thought." Id. at 780-81 (Stewart,,[., concurring). See also Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comin'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561, 564 n.6 (1980); Bates v. Suite Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977). Some commentators have criticized this rationale for limited
protection of commercial speech. See, e.g., Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74
Nw. U.L. Rev. 372, 385-86 (1979).
5" Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72. The courts have not established criteria for determining
whether a statement is one of fact or opinion in commercial speech cases. Courts have discussed
this distinction, however, in defamation cases. See, e.g., Kelley v. Schmidberger, 806 F.2d 44, 47-48
(2d Cir. 1986); janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 759 F.2d 644, 649-51 (8th Cir. 1985); 011mau v. Evans,
750 F.2d 970, 1001-02 nn.6-7 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Appendix).
57 Virginia Rd., 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 (advertising as sine qua nun of commercial profits). See also
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 11.6 (commercial speech as "offspring of economic sell-interest");
Bates, 433 U.S. at 383 (advertiser has "commercial interest in dissemination"). See also TRIBE,
CoNsTrru'rioNAL Cnoleys 211 (1985) ("[s]ince commercial speech is animated solely by the profit
motive, the Court considers it a hardier breed of expression; profit is an antifreeze enabling such
speech to resist, for example, the chill from state regulations intended to promote truth in adver-
tising").
For a discussion of prior restraints of commercial speech, see Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of
Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1204 (11th Cir. 1985); United States Postal Serv. v. Athena Prods., 654
F.2d 562, 367 (5th Cir. 1981); Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2t1 176, 180 (N.D.
1986). See also Note, Commercial Speech and the FTC: A Point of Departure from Traditional First
Amendment Analysis Regarding Prior Restraint, 16 New ENG. L. REV. 793 (1981) which gives the policy
reasons both fur allowing and prohibiting prior restraints on commercial speech.
For a discussion of overbreadth in commercial speech, see Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1982) (overbreadth does not apply to
commercial speech); Bates, 433 U.S. at 380 ("overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if' at all, in the
ordinary commercial context").
In addition, the Court has noted that commercial speech is entitled to less protection because
of its lesser worth. See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5 ("less constitutional moment"); Id.
at 584 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[s]ignificantly more subordinate position in the hierarchy of' First
Amendment values").
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In the 1980 case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission of New
York, the Supreme Court developed a four-part test that established an intermediate
level of scrutiny of state regulation of commercial speech." First, the Court held, if an
advertisement contains false information," is misleading," or proposes an illegal trans-
actions' it may be prohibited entirely."2 Second, the Court continued, if the advertise-
ment does not fall within one of these categories the state may regulate the speech only
if a substantial state interest is involved. 63 Third, the Court noted, once the state dem-
onstrates a substantial interest the regulation is valid only if it directly advances that
interest."4
 Finally, the Court concluded, even if the regulation directly advances the
substantial state interest, the regulation will be upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to
advancing that interest. 63
In sum, because of the minimal danger of chilling, the Supreme Court permits
states greater leeway to regulate commercial speech as compared to core first amendment
speech. States may prohibit entirely false or misleading commercial speech. In addition,
a state need only show a substantial state interest, rather than a compelling interest, to
justify a statute that infringes commercial speech. Thus, depending on the type of speech,
the Court has applied different standards of scrutiny to determine what degree of
58 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Under this four-part test a
restraint on 'commercial communication [that] is neither misleading nor related to an unlawful
activity' is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.").
56
	 at 563. See also Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72 where the Court noted:
Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own
sake. Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false,
but only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle to a State's dealing effectively
with this problem. The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit
the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well
as freely.
Id,
b" Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. This requirement has been extended to include statements
which are potentially misleading. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1979) (use of
trade names in connection with optometric:el practice leads to significant possibilites for deception,
so state can prohibit such trade names).
61 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. See also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496 (1982) (drug related paraphernalia). This requirement has been
extended to include statements which propose a potentially illegal transaction. See Posadas de Puerto
Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2979 (1986) (state may prohibit
advertisements for gambling casino because it may prohibit gambling altogether). But see Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The Court recognizes that we have never
held that commercial speech may be suppressed in order to further the State's interest in discour-
aging purchases of the underlying product that is advertised."). See also Wuliger, The Constitutional
Rights of Puffery: Commercial Speech and the Cigarette Broadcast Advertising Ban, 36 FED. Cont. L.J. I,
22 (1984) ("There is no reason why government should burden First Amendment rights to achieve
indirectly what it does not have the courage to achieve directly.").
62 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
65 Id. at 564.
64 Id.
65 Id. Federal courts differ on whether the requirement that the regulation be no broader than
necessary is identical to the least restrictive means test employed in core first amendment cases.
Compare American Future Sys. v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 752 F.2d 854, 865-66 (3d Cir. 1984)
(the no broader than necessary test is not the same as the least restrictive means test) with Lamar
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 701 F.2d 314, 333 n.26 (5th Cir. 1983)
(construes last part of Central Hudson test as least restrictive means).
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protection the speech receives under the first amendment. Consequently, because issue
advertising contains elements of both core first amendment speech and commercial
speech, courts have been uncertain about the degree of protection this type of speech
receives under the first amendment.
II. CURRENT JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ISSUE ADVERTISING
Issue advertising, also known as "editorial" or "image" advertising or "advertorials,"
is defined in this note as speech by a business entity which expresses its views on issues
of public importance, or describes the business entity itself and its activities." Issue
advertisements come in many forms, including public service announcements, paid
editorials on matters of public concern related and unrelated to the advertiser's business,
and image advertising that informs the public about the advertiser's activities."' Although
the advertiser does not explicitly propose a commercial transaction, these advertisements
often are economically motivated. In fact, many issue advertisements are designed to
boost sales" and improve relations with stockholders, consumers, suppliers or business
customers, or the government, 69 as well as discuss matters of concern both to the general
public and the business entity.
Issue advertisements full between commercial speech and fully protected first
amendment expressions. In general, courts have used two methods to analyze these
expressions. Some courts have examined the advertiser's motive and have concluded
that if the expressions are really implicit proposals for commercial transaction, then they
should receive only the lesser protection afforded commercial speech. Other courts have
examined the value to the public of the message conveyed by the advertisement and
have concluded that if the content falls within the core of the first amendment, then the
advertisement should receive full first amendment protection.
A. Economic-Motivation Analysis
Some courts stress the speaker's motivation in publishing its message, rather than
the value of that message, in determining what type of speech is involved in issue
advertising. Because these courts generally find that the speech is economically moti-
16 FTC Memorandum to the Commission — Corporate Image Advertising, Division of National
Advertising, in SOURCEBOOK, Supra note 1, at 1156.
See Ludlam, supra note 8, at 253-54. Ludlam distinguishes image advertising, which relates
a corporation's activities or products to the corporation's sense of social responsibility, from public
service advertising which addresses topics not directly related to the corporation's activities or
products. The author notes, however, that every corporation has an indirect interest in every public
or private activity, and that public service announcements may reflect favorably on the corporation's
sense of social responsibility, as well as perhaps generating additional profits. Id. at 253.
Additionally, it often is difficult to determine when an advertisement is related to the corpo-
ration's activities. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. For these reasons, this note includes
public service announcements within the definition of image or advocacy advertising.
" FTC Memorandum, supra note 66, at 1156. In a survey, executives were asked to indicate
the reasons their companies engaged in issue advertising. Forty-seven percent expected that such
advertisements would boost sales. Id. at 1157.
Id. In the survey, the executives were allowed to check more than one reason for engaging
in issue advertising; 64% checked stockholder relations, 55% checked consumer relations, 46%
checked supplier or business customer relations, and 32% checked government relations. Id.
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vated, these courts conclude that the speech is commercial speech. Consequently, these
courts subject state regulation of the speech to an intermediate level of scrutiny.
The Supreme Court applied this motivation analysis in the 1983 case of Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Products, and found that an informational pamphlet concerning the useful-
ness of condoms was commercial speech when published by a condom manufacturer."
Youngs, a prophylactics manufacturer, distributed by mail unsolicited informational
pamphlets discussing the problem of venereal disease and the use of condoms in the
prevention of that disease." The pamphlet did not mention Youngs' specific products
by name. The only reference to Youngs was a statement, at the bottom of the last page,
that the pamphlet was provided by Youngs Drugs, distributor of Trojan brand prophy-
lactics."
The Court stated that several factors supported characterizing the pamphlet as
commercial speech. The Court observed that the pamphlet was labelled as an "adver-
tisement."" Additionally, the Court noted, the advertisement referred to a specific prod-
uct." Finally, the Court reasoned, there was strong indication of Youngs' economic
motivation in publishing and distributing the pamphlet." Thus, although the prevention
of venereal disease may be a matter of public concern, the Court's focus on the speaker's
motivation, as evidenced by its relationship to, and interest in, the message, led the Court
to characterize the pamphlet as commercial speech."
Prior to Youngs, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also used a motivation
analysis in deciding an issue advertising case. In National Commission on Egg Nutrition v.
FTC (NCEN), the Seventh Circuit held that the Federal Trade Commission properly
classified the plaintiff's editorials as commercial speech." In NCEN, the FTC prohibited
the National Commission on Egg Nutrition from publishing advertisement that claimed
that no significant evidence exists that egg consumption increases one's risk of heart and
circulatory disease." The Seventh Circuit upheld this prohibition," based on its conclu-
sion that the advertisement contained false and misleading commercial speech.g°
7° 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
Id. at 62. Youngs distributed three types of pamphlets. The first type consisted of multi-page
flyers informing the public of a variety of products available at a drugstore, including prophylactics.
Id. The second type consisted of promotional flyers devoted exclusively or substantially to promoting
prophylactics. Id. The third type consisted of informational pamphlets concerned with the desira-
bility of prophylactics. Id. at n.4. Only the third type troubled the Court in determining proper
classification. Id. at 66.
72 Id, at 62 n.4.
" Id. (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 367 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964)) (mere fact that speech
is labelled as an advertisement does not compel conclusion that the speech is commercial speech).
74 Id, at 66.
m Id. at 67.
m Id.
" 570 F.2d 157, 162-63 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
m Id. at 159. See In Re National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C., 89, 91 (1976), for the
text of NCEN's advertisement. The Federal Trade Commission claimed jurisdiction under § 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id, Section 5 states, in relevant part, that "[u]nfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982). Section 5 is applicable to false or
misleading advertisements. See, e.g., Giant Food lnc. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 977, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
("There can be no doubt at this late date that advertising which is false or deceptive is within the
proscription of § 5."), cert. dismissed, 376 U.S. 967 (1964).
7° NCEN, 570 F.2d at 165-67. The order was upheld with modification. For the original order,
see In Re National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. at 203-05.
NCEN, 570 F.2d at 160-63.
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In arriving at this decision, the court followed the Supreme Court's definition of
commercial speech as speech which does no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion." The Seventh Circuit rejected NCEN's argument that its statements were more an
expression of opinion concerning a matter of public debate than an invitation to transact
business." The court reasoned that NCEN's statements did not constitute opinion be-
cause the statements were phrased as factual claims that denied the existence of medical
evidence concerning cholesterol."
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit stated that a court's view of the importance of the
issue raised by an advertisement is not relevant in determining the protection granted
the speech." The court concluded that even though NCEN's editorial concerned an
important public health matter, the editorial's content alone should not entitle the speech
to full first amendment protection." Moreover, the court construed the Supreme Court's
definition of commercial speech to include claims about an advertiser's product made
for the purpose of persuading the consumer to purchase that product, regardless of the
manner in which the advertiser presents the information." Thus, although NCEN's
advertisements did not explicitly propose a commercial transaction, the court determined
that the advertisements implied a transaction and, therefore, constituted commercial
speech." Because the Seventh Circuit found that NCEN's advertisements qualified as
commercial speech, and that the advertisements were false and misleading, the court
upheld the FTC prohibition.
In summary, sonic courts have used a motivation analysis in deciding issue adver-
tising cases. In general, these courts consider the speaker's motivation, as evidenced by
the speaker's relationship to the product discussed, as relevant in determining whether
the speech is commercial speech. Thus, even though the speech's content may relate to
a matter of public concern, the courts conclude that the importance of the content alone
does not entitle the speech to full constitutional protection.
B. Content-Oriented Analyst's
In contrast to the motivation analysis, other courts have stressed the importance of
the content of the speech rather than the speaker's motivation in communicating the
81 Id. at 162. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text for definitions of commercial speech.
82 NCEN, 570 F.2d at 162-63.
" Id. at 163. The court stated that "[first, as to the nature and purpose of NCEN's statements,
they were not phrased, as statements of opinion but categorically" and falsely denied the existence
of evidence that in fact. exists and were made for the purpose of persuading the people who read
them to buy eggs." Id.
84 Id. The court noted that "the right of the government to restrain false advertising can hardly
depend upon the view of' an agency or court as to the relative importance of the issue to which the
false advertising relates." Id.
85 Id.
"Id. The Seventh Circuit concluded that:
[A]s to the intended scope of the Supreme Court's expressions on the subject of
commercial speech, we believe they were not intended to be narrowly limited to the
mere proposal of a particular commercial transaction but extended to false claims as
to the harmlessness of the advertiser's product asserted for the purpose of persuading
members of the reading public to buy the product. The nature of the communication
is not changed when a group of sellers joins in advertising their common product.
Id.
87 Id.
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message. Because these courts generally find that the speech concerns a matter of
important public debate, they characterize the speech as noncommercial. Consequently,
these courts subject the regulation of the speech to the strict level of scrutiny that applies
to core first amendment speech.
The Supreme Court used this content-oriented approach in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellolli, where the Court found unconstitutional a statute that prohibited cor-
porations from contributing to discussions of political matters that did not directly affect
the corporation. 99 In Bellolli, the Bank of Boston wished to publicize its views concerning
an upcoming referendum that would permit the legislature to impose a graduated tax
on individual income. 99 The Massachusetts General Laws, however, prohibited certain
types of business corporations from making contributions to influence a public vote on
any issue not materially affecting their business. 90 The Massachussets Attorney General
invoked the statute to prohibit the bank from expressing its views on the tax referendum,
arguing that a corporation has freedom to engage only in commercial speech, that is,
speech which materially affects the corporation. 91 The bank, however, argued that a
graduated personal income tax would affect its business materially by creating a tax
climate which would drive business corporations away from Masssachusetts and adversely
affect the bank's financial position.92
Although the Supreme Court did not rule on the merits of the bank's argument, it
found the statute unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the statute infringed on
corporate political speech that may be valuable to its listeners." The Bellotti Court noted
that Massachussets sought to invert the commercial speech doctrine by allowing first
amendment protection to a corporation's "hawking of wares," while imposing criminal
88 435 U.S. 765, 784-86 (1978). Bellotti has been the subject of a great deal of critical scrutiny.
See, e.g., Miller, On Politics, Democracy, and the First Amendment: A Commentary on First National Bank
v. Bellotti, 38 WASH. LEE L.R. 21 (1981); Prentice, Consolidated Edison and Bellotti: First Amendment
Protection of Corporate Political Speech, 16 Tut..sn Li. 599 (1981); Schaefer, The First Amendment, Media
Conglomerates and "Business" Corporations: Can Corporations Safely Involve Themselves in the Political
Process?, 55 Si'. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1980); Shaw, Corporate Speech in the Marketplace of Ideas, 7 J. CORP.
L. 265 (1982); Note, The Corporation and the Constitution: Economic Due Process and Corporate Speech,
90 YALE L. J . 1833, 1853-57 (1981); Casenote, Constitutional Law — First Amendment — Corporate Free
Speech: First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 20 B.C.L. REV. 1003 (1979).
"Bellolli, 435 U.S. at 769.
9° Mass. GEN. L. ch. 55, § 8 (1978). The statute provides, in pertinent part:
No corporation carrying on the business of a bank, trust, surety, indemnity, safe
deposit ... [or anyl business corporation incorporated under the laws of or doing
business in the commonwealth and no officer or agent acting in behalf of any corpo-
ration mentioned in this section, shall directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or
contribute, or promise to give, pay, expend or contribute, any money or other valuable
thing for the purpose of aiding, promoting or preventing the nomination of election
of any person to pubic office, or aiding, promoting or antagonizing the interests of
any politic'al party, or influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to
the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets
of the corporation.
Id.
9 ' Bellolli, 435 U.S. at 771. The Supreme Judical Court of Massachusetts held that a corporation
can express itself only on matters materially affecting the corporation. First Nael Bank of Boston
v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 773, 785, 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1270 (1977).
42 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 770 n.4.
See id. at 785 n.21.
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sanctions for expressions of opinion on matters of general public interest." The Court
emphasized that the first amendment is designed to foster not only self-expression, 95 but
also access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of ideas. 96 The Bellotti Court
noted that Massachussets sought to regulate speech found at the "heart of the First
Amendment" — speech concerning a matter which was to be put to public vote." The
Court dismissed the argument that the integrity of the elective process was jeopardized
because the bank could outspend many other groups and communicate its message to
the voters more effectively." Rather, the Court concluded that a speaker should not be
penalized merely because he or she may have a greater ability to influence listeners."
Furthermore, the Bellotti Court stressed that the first amendment emphasizes the
worth of the speech, rather than the nature of the speaker and the speaker's relation to
the message. 19° According. to the Court, commercial speech is protected because of the
society's interest in the free flow of commercial information, not to protect the corpo-
ration's business interests. 19 '. For this reason, the Court did not decide whether the speech
materially affected the speaker's business interests as the Massachusetts statute re-
quired.' 92 The Court noted that the bank's alleged interest in the question of graduated
personal income tax demonstrated the amorphous and often conjectural nature of
modern economic relationships.")5 As a result, the Court observed, a business can never
"Id. at 783 n.20. The Court noted that:
It is somewhat ironic that appellee seeks to reconcile these [commercial speech] deci-
sions with the "materially affecting" concept by noting that the commercial speaker
would "have a direct financial interest in the speech." Until recently, the "purely
commercial" nature of an advertisement was thought to undermine and even negate
its entitlement to the sanctuary of the First Amendment. Appellee would invert the
debate by giving constitutional significance to a corporation's "hawking of wares" while
approving criminal sanctions for a bank's expression of opinion on a tax law of general
public interest.
Id. (citation omitted).
The Court borrows the phrase "hawking of wares" from Justice Rehnquist's dissent in the
Virginia Bd. decision. justice Rehnquist stated that "[t]he logical consequences of the Court's decision
in this case, a decision which elevates commercial intercourse between a seller hawking his wares
and a buyer seeking to strike a hargain, to the same plane as has been previously reserved for the
free marketplace of ideas, are far reaching indeed." Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 781 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
Os Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783, put see justice White's dissent:
Indeed, what sonic have considered to be ,the principal function of the First Amend-
ment, the use of communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization, and
self-fulfilment, is not at all furthered by corporate speech. It is clear that the com-
munications of prolitmaking corporations are not "an integral part of' the development
of ideas, of mental exploration and the affirmation of self."
Id. at 801-05 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
9" Id, at 783.
"7 Id. at 776. The majority rejected Justice Rehnquist's argument that, because the first amend-
ment is designed to foster sell' expression and a.corporation has no "self" to foster, a corporation
has no first amendment rights. Id, at 825-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 789-9(1. But see Miller, supra note 88, at 23-24.
9' Retinal., 435 U.S. at 700.
I'm Id. at 783.
01 Id
1 ' 2 See id. at 785 n.21.
"Id. The Bank argued that a graduated income tax might lead to an unfavorable tax climate
in Massachusetts which would cause businesses to either leave Massachusetts or choose not to relocate
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be certain when a court would agree that a certain political issue could materially affect
the business. 1 " Because a business may refrain from speaking on any matter, including
matters of public importance, due to the fear of government regulation and penalties,
the Court accorded the bank's speech full first amendment protection.'°' Thus, the
Bellotti Court held that on matters of public importance, speech by a business entity is
afforded full first amendment protection because of the speech's value and the potential
chilling effects of a regulation permitting only speech which relates to the business.
The Supreme Court also followed a content-oriented approach in the 1980 case of
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service Commission of New York.'°° In this case,
Consolidated Edison placed inserts in its billing envelopes that argued that nuclear power
plants are safe, economic, and clean. 107
 The Public Service Commission subsequently
prohibited Consolidated Edison from using its billing envelopes to discuss political mat-
ters, including the "desirability of future development of nuclear power."'" The Su-
preme Court, in contrast, held that the first amendment fully protected Consolidated
Edison's speech concerning nuclear energy because of the importance of the content.'"
Because the Court focused on the content of the utility company's speech, it did not
consider whether the relationship between Consolidated Edison and the advertised issue
turned the inserts into implicit commercial transactions. 110 The Court emphasized that
the speech was political in nature, discussed an issue of public concern, and added a
valuable viewpoint which the public should be entitled to hear.'" The Court therefore
accorded Consolidated Edison's speech the full protection of the first amend ment." 2
to Massachusetts, thus depriving the Bank of potential loans to, and deposits by, these relocated
businesses and their employees. Id.
104 Id.
' 05 Id.
1 °6 447 U.S. 530, 533-35 (1980). Consolidated Edison has generated considerable scholarly liter:
ature. See, e.g., Prentice, .supra note 90; Note, The Two-Track Model of First Amendment Adjudication
After Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 62 B.U.L. REV. 215 (1982); Casenote,
Consolidated Edison Company of New York v. Public Service Commission: Freedom of Speech Extended
to Monopolies — Is There No Escape for the Consumer? 8 PEPPER!) [NE L. REV. 1087 (1981).
107
 Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 532.
108 Id.
bo Id, at 533, 535, 544.
"° See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5 (1980). The Supreme Court stated that, "[w]e rule
today in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n that utilities enjoy the full panoply of First
Amendment protection for their direct comments on public issues. There is no reason for providing
similar constitutional protection when such statements are made in the context of commercial
transactions." Id.
I" Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 535.
112 Id. In Pacific Gas & Eke. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'', of California, 106 S. Ct 903 (1986),
the Supreme Court again used a content-oriented analysis. PG&E inserted a newsletter in its billing
envelope. Id. at 905. One newsletter included stories about PG&E's payment plans, its efforts to
help the bald eagles in California, holiday recipes, and instructions on how to weatherstrip one's
home. Id. at 905 n. I, See Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement and Appendix thereto, at A-183--A-
190, Pacific Gas & Eke. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of California, 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986). The insert
stated, "[b]ald eagles in 'the Pit River area of Northern California have a friend in PG&E. The
company, cooperating with state and federal agencies, is working to help them prosper." Id. at A-
186. Other editions included editorials on the merits of recently passed and currently pending
legislation. PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 905. Unfortunately, no examples of PG&E's statements on legislation
were included in either the parties' briefs to the Court or the Supreme Court's opinion. The Court
concluded that the content of the newsletters contained matters of public concern, and therefore
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Similarly, in the 1986 case of In the Matter of R.J. Reynolds, an administrative law
judge ruled that the first amendment Fully protected a cigarette manufacturer's editorial
which claimed that a recent government study failed to prove any connection between
smoking and heart disease.' 19 In reaching this conclusion, the judge looked at the manner
in which the advertiser presented the speech and its contribution to debate on important
public issues)" Because the judge found that the speech was presented in an editorial
format rather than as a commercial advertisement and related to a matter of public
health, the judge granted full first amendment protection to the manufacturer's
speech." 3
In this case, Rd. Reynolds, a major cigarette manufacturer, published an editorial
advertisement that stated that an extensive government study, which cost $115,000,000
and took ten years, failed to prove a link between smoking and heart disease."" The
accorded full first amendment protection to the newsletters. Id. at 908. The Court slated that
PG&E's newsletter "thus extends well beyond speech that proposes a business transaction, and
includes the kind of discussion of' 'matters of public concern' that the First Amendment both fully
protects and implicitly encourages." Id. (citations omitted).
" 3 No. 9206 at 12-13 (lrrc Aug. 4, 1986) (order granting motion to dismiss) [hereinafter
Reynolds Order].
"4 Id. at 7.
"s Id. at 7, 9, 10, 12-13.
" 6 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No, 9206 (LEXIS, Genfed library, F-TC file) (FTC June 11,
1986) [hereinafter Reynolds Cornplaini]. Reynolds' editorial, "Of Cigarettes and Science," stated, in
part:
You probably know about research that links smoking to certain diseases. Coro-
nary heart disease is one of them.
Much of this evidence consists of studies that show a statistical association between
smoking and the disease.
But statistics themselves cannot explain why smoking and heart disease are asso-
ciated. Thus, scientists have developed a theory: that heart disease is caused by smok-
ing. Then they performed various experiments to check this theory.
We would like to tell you about one of the most important of these experiment.
It was called the Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial (MR FIT).
In the words or the Wall Street journal, it was "one of the largest medical
experiments ever attempted." Funded by the Federal government, it cost $115,000,000
and took 10 years, ending in 1982.
The subjects were over 12,000 men who were thought to have a high risk of heart
disease because of three risk factors that are statistically associated with this disease:
smoking, high blood pressure and high cholesterol levels.
Half of the men received no special medical intervention. The other half received
medical treatment that consistently reduced all three risk factors, compared with the
first group.
After 10 years, there was no statistically significant difference between the two
groups in the number of heart disease deaths.
•
We at R. j. Reynolds do not claim this study proves that smoking doesn't cause
heart disease. But we do wish to make a point.
Despite the results of MR FIT and other experiments like it, many scientists have
not abandoned or modified their original theory, or re-examined its assumptions.
They continue to believe these factors cause heart disease. But it is important to
label their belief accurately. It is an opinion. A judgment. But not scientific fact.
Id.
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Federal Trade Commission brought suit against R.J. Reynolds, alleging that these edi-
torials were commercial speech." 7 Furthermore, the FTC alleged that the editorials were
deceptive and misleading"s because they failed to mention that the government study
showed that men who quit smoking had a lower rate of heart disease than those who
continued to smoke.""
The administrative law judge, noting that no precise definition of commercial speech
exists, 120 observed that from a common sense point of view, the advertisement clearly
was an editOrial.' 21
 In arriving at this conclusion, the judge looked at the advertisement's
language and format. 122 Thus, because Reynolds phrased and formatted its advertise-
ment to look like an editorial, the judge held that, using common sense, it was an
editorial,
The judge reasoned that an advertiser's motive is immaterial in determining an
advertisement's meaning, and rejected evidence submitted by the FTC that demonstrated
Reynolds' motive in publishing the editorials.' 23 Although the judge considered the
112
 Reynolds Order, supra note 113, at 7.
ne Reynolds Complaint, supra note 116, para. 8. ("The acts and practices of respondent as
alleged in this complaint constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce
in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.").
19 1d, at para. 7. The complaint read:
In light of the respresentation made in the advertisement, and because of the way in
which the advertisment describes the MR FIT study and its results, respondent's failure
to disclose:
(a) that men in the study who quit smoking had a significantly lower rate of
coronary heart disease death than men who continued to smoke; or
(b) that the MR FIT study results are consistent with previous studies showing
that those two (sic) quit smoking enjoy a substantial decrease in coronary heart disease
mortality,
renders the advertisement deceptive.
Id,
120 Reynolds Order, supra note 113, at 3.
' 21 Id. au 7. The judge noted that "Rio argue that this editorial ad is similar to the informational
pamphlets in Bolger or to the NCEN ad is contrary to reason and common sense. From a common
sense approach, Reynolds' 'Of cigarettes and science' is clearly an editorial; it is not commercial
speech by any stretch of the imagination." Id.
' 22 Id. at 7-8. The judge reasoned that, "Wirs1, we think the language of the ad is uncomplicated
and the ad will be easily understood by any reasonable reader as an op-ed piece, not a cigarette
ad." (emphasis in original). Id. The judge concluded that "[lin this case, Reynolds' ad is on its face
an editorial expression of Reynolds' opinion regarding a public issue of economic importance." Id.
at 12.
12 ' Id. at 8 n.8. The judge stated that "[t]he Commission [the FTC) and courts, however, have
consistently held that the intent or motive of an advertiser is immaterial to the determination of an
ad's meaning .... And in none of the commercial speech cases complaint counsel rely on or we
are aware of, the Court went beyond the ads to resolve the commercial/noncommercial speech
issue." Id. (citations omitted).
The FTC, however, had proposed a framework for deciding issue advertising cases where the
motive of the advertiser is relevant in determining an advertisement's meaning. According to this
proposal, an image advertisement falls within the FTC's jurisdiction if its dominant effect is eco-
nomic rather than political. FTC Memorandum, supra note 66, at 1166. In determining whether
the speech is economic or political, the ITC considers the advertiser's motive relevant. Publication
with the hopes of improving the advertiser's financial situation supports the inference that the
speech should be classified as commercial expression. Id. at 1177.
In addition, the FTC considered other factors relevant, such as whether a business entity
prepared the advertisement; whether the advertisement includes elements usually included in the
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possibility that advertisers may craft promotional messages in the form of editorials to
immunize false and deceptive speech,I 24 the judge held that the danger of chilling free
expression by businesses on public issues outweighed that concern.'"
In addition to considering the content of Reynolds' speech, the judge also considered
the Federal Trade Commission's motivation for invoking section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts affecting commerce. 126 The
judge speculated that the FTC invoked section 5 not because R.J. Reynolds' statements
were misleading, but because the FTC distrusted anything a cigarette manufacturer may
say concerning smoking and its relation to health.' 27 The judge noted, moreover, that
the first amendment is fundamentally opposed to restrictions designed to curtail ex-
pression of a particular point of view.'" Because of its relationship to a matter of public
concern, and to avoid possibly chilling valuable expression, the administrative law judge
accorded R.J. Reynolds' editorial full protection under the first amendment. 129
In conclusion, when courts have used a content-oriented analysis in deciding issue
advertising cases, courts stress the importance of the content and its relation to matters
of public concern. In general, because these courts determine that protection is accorded
the speech because of its value to the listener, the speaker's motivation is not relevant in
determining whether the speech should be considered commercial or noncommercial
speech. When issue advertising relates to a matter of public concern, therefore, courts
grant the advertisements full first amendment protection under a content-oriented anal-
ysis, and require any regulation of issue advertising to withstand strict scrutiny.
business's product advertisements; whether the business sells products under the same brand name
that appears in the advertisement; whether the advertisement describes the business's activities or
contains statements about subjects other than business activities; whether the advertisement focuses
on the business's activities rather than some general subject; and whether the advertisement ex-
pressly connects the business's activities to a political issue. Id. at 1167. The presence of these factors
would indicate that a reader would understand the advertisement as primarily economic, and not
political in nature, and the corporate expression would therefore fall within commercial speech
and FTC regulations. Id. at 1166-67.
I" Reynolds Order, supra note 113, at 12-13. The judge noted that laldmittedly, proper
classification of Reynolds' ad is not an easy task. The thought that it may be possible to craft
promotional messages in the guise of an editorial gives us pause." Id.
1111 1d. at 13, where the judge noted:
On the other hand, any attempt to expand the traditional boundaries of Section 5
jurisdiction in order to reach editorial ads which may contain elements complaint
counsel may consider objectionable, as appears to be the case here, is likely to produce
the unwanted effect of chilling free expression of opinions on public issues of concern
to business firms which enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment with respect
to noncommercial speech.
Id.




Order, supra note 113, at 11. The judge found "these statements suggestive of what
may be complaint counsel's unstated reasons for invoking Section 5 in this case, namely their
solicitude for the public health and wariness of anything a cigarette manufacturer may have to say
about this issue of smoking and health." Id.
128 Id, at 11-12. The judge noted that "Nile Court has made it clear that regulation of speech
that is motivated by a desire to curtail expression of a particular point of view on controversial
issues of general interest is 'the purest example' of a law abridging freedom of speech and is
impermissible under the first amendment." Id. (citations omitted).
'29
	 at 12-13.
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III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CURRENT APPROACHES TO ISSUE ADVERTISEMENTS
To date, courts have not approached issue advertisement cases consistently or pre-
dictably.'" Some cases have focused on the value of the speech to the listener while
others have looked to the motivation of the speaker. In addition to leading to inconsistent
results, both the motivation and the content based approaches have serious flaws. In
light of the Supreme Court's reasons for protecting speech, both approaches suffer from
conceptual and practical shortcomings.
The motivation analysis is conceptually flawed because under this approach courts
assume that an economic motivation automatically deprives speech of full first amend-
ment protection. As the Supreme Court noted in Virginia Board, however, motivation is
not a sufficient reason for limiting the right of the speaker.' 3 ' Indeed, the Virginia Board
Court held that merely because the advertiser has an economic motive for advertising,
this motivation does not deprive commercial speech of constitutional protection.'" The
motivation-oriented approach, therefore, is inconsistent with the Virginia Board Court's
reasons for allowing commercial speech first amendment protection because it allows
greater state regulation based on the business's motivation in publishing its viewpoint.
The Virginia Board Court granted commercial speech some first amendment pro-
tection because both the consumer and society in general may have an interest in what
the corporation says about its product.'" Although the Virginia Board Court did not
grant commercial speech plenary protection, the Court limited the protection not because
the speaker was economically motivated, but because the advertiser can verify the truth-
fulness of its claims and because the necessity of business advertising would outweigh
any chilling effects regulations may have on the speech.' 31 Therefore, based on the
reasons for granting limited protection to commercial speech, economic motivation
should not limit the protection offered.
Motivation analysis also may lead to undesirable practical consequences. I f a business
exists for the purpose of making money, courts may find that any and all of its adver-
tisements are economically motived — that is, published either to increase sales directly
by proposing a transaction, or increase sales indirectly by presenting a positive image.
Further, even if economic interest does not motivate all decisions, as the Bellotti Court
noted, virtually any particular advertisement or editorial might affect the business in
some way.'" Given this possibility, a governmental agency could assert that almost any
speech by a business is commercial speech, and could curtail such speech under the less
exacting intermediate scrutiny review when it disagrees with the business's viewpoint.
ISO Compare Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983) (Supreme Court adopted
a motivation-oriented analysis when condom manufacturer distributed informational pamphlets
detailing use of condoms in preventing venereal disease) with First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 776-78 (1978) (Supreme Court adopted content-oriented analysis when state sought
to prevent Bank from advocating its position on tax reform) and Consolidated Edison Co. of New
York v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-40 (1980) (Supreme Court used content-based
analysis when utility commission tried to restrain utility from including pamphlets in its billing
envelopes claiming that nuclear energy is clean and efficient),
" 1 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976).
"2 Id.
"2 Id. at 763-65.
124 Id. at 771 n.24.
"5 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785 n.21.
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Thus, if courts consistently used a motivation analysis, they could label all speech by a
commercial enterprise commercial speech, and the government could unduly regulate
information that is important to the public or espouses a controversial view on a matter
of public concern. This undue regulation would undermine the first amendment's com-
mitment to uninhibited and robust discussion of matters of public concern.'" The
motivation analysis, therefore, is flawed not only because it does not take into account
the reasons for protecting commercial speech, but because it could lead to excessive
government intervention through prohibiting speech with which the government dis-
agrees.
The "content-oriented" analysis, however, also presents both conceptual and prac-
tical problems in analyzing issue advertisements under the first amendment. In using
the content-oriented analysis, courts examine the value in the expression.'" If they find
that the speech relates to a matter of public concern, courts will accord the issue adver-
tisement full first amendment protection.'"
Conceptually, however, this approach is misguided because, although it recognizes
that commercial speech lies within the first amendment, it fails to consider the limitations
imposed on the protection granted commercial speech. According to the Virginia Board
Court, commercial speech receives first amendment protection because it contributes to
well informed decisions concerning the private allocation of resources, and because the
information conveyed may be more important to the individual than the most pressing
political concerns of the day.'" At this level, therefore, the content-oriented approach
correctly grants first amendment protection to issue advertisements because of their
content's importance.
In Virginia Board, however, the Court also noted that speech by a business entity
may be entitled to less than full first amendment protection even when the content is
important to consumers.'" The Court noted that commercial speech protection is limited
because of the minimal danger of chilling, not because of the content's lesser value.")
Thus, the conceptual problem created by the content-oriented approach is that it. fails
to consider that the advertiser may be able to verify the truthfulness of its advertisements,
as well as the possibly minimal danger of chilling the reasons for limiting commercial
speech protection.
In addition to the conceptual problems with the content-oriented approach, two
practical problems emerge when employing this analysis. First, if courts granted issue
advertisements full first amendment protection because of the importance of the content,
an advertiser could publish deceptive, misleading, or false information under the guise
of an editorial, although the advertiser could not publish that information otherwise. 12
16 See Reynolds Order, supra note 113, at 11.
"7 See, e.g., Pacific Gas, 106 S. Ct. at 908 (articles on weatherstripping, utility company's efforts
to help bald eagles and recipes accorded full first amendment protection); Rellalti, 435 U.S. at 776-
78 (bank's statements regarding proposed tax reform protected).
05 See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S.•at 776-78.
," Virginia lid., 425 U.S. at 763-134, 770.
140 Id. at 771 n.24.
141 Id.
142 Reynolds Order, supra note 113, at 11. See also Myers, Suit Against RJ, Reynolds Is No Threat
to Corporate Expression, L.A. Daily J., July 9, 1986, at 4, col. 6. The author notes that "[Olie company
tries to disguise this clearly commercial effort by putting its ad into the format of a newspaper
editorial or op-ed piece, simply to expand its First Amendment protection." Id.
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Second, by stressing the speech's value, courts create a "slippery slide," creating uncer-
tainty about which topics should receive full first amendment protection and which topics
are of lesser value and entitled to lesser protection."'
The motivation-oriented and content-oriented analyses also share a common flaw.
Both approaches attempt to fit the speech into existing pigeonholes, either of core first
amendment speech or commercial transaction."' By its very nature, an issue advertise-
ment is a hybrid, containing both an expression on a controversial issue of public concern
and an expression of a possible implied commercial transaction. As Kich, an issue
advertisement cannot fit neatly into either category.
In summary, both the motivation-oriented and the content-oriented analyses cannot
evaluate issue advertisements properly in light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of
first amendment protections. The motivation-based approach grants a lesser degree of
protection to such speech based on the motivation of the speaker, although economic
motivation alone is not a sufficient reason for limiting protection. In practical effect, a
governmental agency may claim that economic considerations motivate any speech by a
business entity and, therefore, the agency may restrict speech with which it disagrees if
the regulation can withstand the lesser scrutiny accorded to commercial speech. The
content-oriented analysis fails to consider the reason for not granting full first amend-
ment protection For commercial speech, that is, because of the lesser possibility of chilling.
In practice, the content-oriented analysis allows a business entity to publish false and
misleading information, although that information could not be published if the speech
were considered commercial expression. Furthermore, no clear criteria exist for deter-
mining whether the speech has sufficient public importance to allow full protection.
Finally, both approaches attempt to fit issue advertisements into the pre-existing cate-
gories of either commercial speech or core first amendment speech without considering
the unique characteristics of issue advertisements.
IV. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR DECIDING ISSUE ADVERTISING CASES
This note proposes a new framework for determining the protection that issue
advertisements should receive under the first amendment. Rather than attempt to ca-
' 4 ' See Libel Law and the First Amendment: Hearings Before the Subeomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Admin. of Justice, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1985) (testimony of Floyd Abrams, Esq., Partner,
Cahill, Gordon & Reindel). Attorney Abrams observed that:
[Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Creenmoss Builders, Inc., 462 U.S. 749 (1985)] is a trou-
bling, disturbing opinion for a variety of reasons. The reason is not that it is all that
important that credit reports receive as much protection as political speech; the reason
is that the Court has now, it seems to me, plunged into the area of determining for
itself what sort of speech is more important and less important speech, an approach
which 1 thought they had rejected.
Are the courts really to pass on whether the topic or the subject was important
enough to get first amendment protection?
Now, my problem with it is not just administrative. There is an administrative or
bureaucratic problem; we're going to have a lot more cases, the courts are going to
have to answer a lot more questions. That is not the end of the world, The problem
is that I don't think the courts ought to be in the business of making that sort of
decision in the first place. And so, for that reason, the decision does trouble me a lot.
Id. at 24-25.
144 On the tendency of the Supreme Court to "pigeonhole" first amendment cases, see TRIBE,
supra note 57, at 218.
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tegorize issue advertising as either core first amendment or commercial speech, this
framework regards issue advertisements as a separate category of expression. Under
this framework, courts deciding issue advertisement cases should use neither the strict
scrutiny standard of review reserved for regulations of core first amendment speech,
nor the intermediate scrutiny reserved for regulations of commercial speech. On the
contrary, courts should apply a different level of scrutiny when deciding whether reg-
ulations of issue advertisements are acceptable. This note proposes that if the regulated
speech contains false or deceptive statements of fact which the advertiser should know
arc false or deceptive, then the government may prohibit the advertisement regardless
of its interest in regulating the speech. If, however, the regulated speech consists of a
statement of opinion, a truthful statement of fact, or a false and misleading statement
of fact which the advertiser cannot know was false or misleading, then courts should
subject the regulation to strict scrutiny.
Courts currently use two analyses when confronted with issue advertisements. Some
courts focus on the speaker's motivation and regard issue advertisements as commercial
speech and, therefore, apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to the regulation of the
speech. Other courts focus on the importance of' the content of the speech, find that the
speech lies within the core of the first amendment, and apply a strict level of scrutiny to
the regulation.'" Instead of attempting to fit issue advertisements into either the category
of commercial speech or core first amendment speech, courts should regard issue ad-
vertisements as a unique entity, sharing qualities of both types of speech. In conformity
with its hybrid nature, courts should use a hybrid standard of review in deciding issue
advertising cases.
This proposed framework draws upon elements of both types of speech. It is
necessary, therefore, to examine the underlying reasons for the protections afforded
each type in order to determine the proper standard of judicial review for issue adver-
tisements. Courts strictly scrutinize regulations of core first amendment speech because
free and open public debate is important and courts are reluctant to chill the free flow
of ideas.'" Regulation of commercial speech, however, is subject only to the intermediate
level of scrutiny which the Court adopted in Central Hudson)"7 Under the Central Hudson
standard, if the commercial speech is false or misleading, government may prohibit it.''"'
If the commercial speech is not false or misleading, however, the state may regulate it
only if the state demonstrates a substantial government interest in regulating the speech,
the regulation advances that substantial interest, and it is no broader than necessary to
achieve that goal.'" Although courts refer to this as a four-part test, both structurally
i"Compare Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983) (Supreme Court adopted
a motivation-oriented analysis when condom manufacturer distributed informational pamphlets
detailing use of condoms in preventing venereal disease) with First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 776-78 (1978) (Supreme Court adopted content-oriented analysis when Massachusetts
sought to prevent Bank from advocating the Bank's position on tax reform) and Consolidated
Edison Co. of New York v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-40 (1980) (Supreme Court
used content-based analysis when utility commission tried to restrain utility from inserting into its
billing envelopes pamphlets claiming that nuclear energy is clean and efficient).
"4" See .supra notes 27-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the protection of core first
amendment speech.
47 See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Central Hudson four-
part test.
t" See .supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
19 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
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and theoretically this test is better understood as a two-pronged test. First, the speech
must be truthful and not deceptive. Second, the regulation must pass intermediate
scrutiny, that is, be no broader than necessary to advance directly a substantial state
interest.
Structurally, the first prong of the Central Hudson test relates to the advertisement
itself and is based on a different rationale than the second prong, which relates to the
regulation. The Virginia Board Court's reasoning provides the first prong. According to
the Virginia Board Court, false factual statements may be protected only because of the
chilling that would result if speakers had to ensure that all statements they made were
true.'" A commercial advertisement, however, generally contains factual statements that
the advertiser can verify easily because of its knowledge of the product or service. 151
Therefore, regulations may prohibit false and misleading claims by advertisers. 152 Thus,
courts allow the government to prohibit false and misleading commercial speech under
the first prong of the Central Hudson test because, as the Virginia Board Court noted,
advertisers generally know when their statements are false or misleading.
The second prong of Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny test is justified by the
Virginia Board Court's other reason for limiting commercial speech protection —. the
minimal fear of chilling. The second prong requires that the government show only a
substantial state interest in regulating commercial speech. In contrast, the government
must demonstrate a compelling state interest if it wants to regulate noncommercial speech
because of the "chilling" that might result when individuals are reluctant to speak for
fear that their otherwise protected speech may be regulated.'" Commercial advertisers,
however, must advertise in order to sell their products or services and, therefore, will
continue to speak through advertising even when faced with possible regulation of their
speech.'" Thus, because of the minimal danger of chilling noted in Virginia Board, courts
may justify Central Hudson's less exacting scrutiny of commercial speech regulations.'"
In the context of issue advertisements, the first prong of the Central Hudson test
remains applicable, but the second prong does not apply. Courts should not permit
advertisers to make false statements because regardless of the format in which the
information is presented, the advertiser's knowledge remains constant. Thus, whether
an advertiser states that people should buy eggs because no evidence exists that eggs are
related to coronary disease, or expresses this statement in an editorial concerning recent
government studies, the level of the advertiser's knowledge remains the same. If the
statement is false, and the advertiser has reason to know it is false because of its
involvement with the product — whether presented as an invitation for commercial
transaction or as an editorial on a matter of public concern — the statement should not
be granted constitutional protection.
Courts should not apply the second prong of the intermediate scrutiny test to issue
advertisements. Instead, courts should apply a strict level of scrutiny to afford issue




 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64. See supra notes 59-61.
1 " New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279 (1964).
' 54 See Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72.
155
 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
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advertisements full first amendment protection, but only if the advertisements are not
false or misleading. Advertisers need not express opinions on controversial subjects to
sell their products or services.'" Undue regulation, which courts would likely uphold
under an intermediate level of scrutiny, may chill an advertiser's contribution to the
public debate. Under the proposed test, however, if the advertisement contains only
statements of opinion, or true and nondeceptive statements of fact, then the regulation
would be subject to strict scrutiny.
This framework leads to results which better effectuate the purposes underlying
the first amendment's protection of speech. Unlike the content-oriented analysis, this
approach would not allow an advertiser to immunize false or misleading statements
under the guise and format of an editorial on a matter of public importance.'" If the
statement is false, it is not protected under the first amendment, whether expressed in
connection with a commercial transaction or in a public service announcement. In
addition, unlike under the motivation-oriented analysis, no danger exists that govern-
ment may regulate true and nondeceptive speech by an advertiser merely because the
government disagrees with the content.'" Courts would subject the regulation to strict
scrutiny. Therefore, to consider issue advertisements properly under the first amend-
ment, courts should use the following framework. If the speech contains erroneous or
misleading factual statements,'" and the advertiser knows or should know that these
statements are false or deceptive, then government may regulate or prohibit such state-
ments. If the statement is one of opinion, however, or it is a true factual assertion, or
one which the advertiser has no reason to know is false, then courts should accord the
speech full first amendment protection.
Applying this framework to some previously discussed cases illustrates its benefits.
For example, under this framework, courts should consider both the Bank of Boston's
editorial concerning the impact of graduated personal income taxi" and Consolidated
Edison's claim that nuclear power is clean and efficient'"' statements of opinion. 162
156
 Sec Abrams, Restricting Corporate Editorial Comment Hardly Serves the Public, L.A. Daily J., July
9,1986, an 4, col. 6. Abrams observes:
Corporate speech on matters of public debate] is peculiarly subject to being chilled,
not because corporations are poor or defenseless but because it is so easy for them to
spend their money elsewhere than on editorial advertisements. Such expressions of
opinion are always controversial. For many corporations, that controversy alone is
reason enough to choose silence. For most others, the prospect of a bruising battle
with the FFC is ample reason to devote resources to product advertisements rather
than editorial commentary.
Id.
157 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
158 See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
159 See Note, Yes, FTC, There is a Virginia: The Impact of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, Inc. on the Federal Trade Commission's Regulation of Misleading
Advertising, 57 B.U.L. REV. 833,849-52 (1977) (suggesting reasonable person standard for deter-
mining if statement of fact contained in advertisement is false or misleading).
16° First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
I"' Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530
(1989).
In The distinction between fact and opinion is not always clear, and is specific to the circum-
stances of each case. Courts can analogize this distinction in commercial speech cases to the treatment
of the same distinction in libel and slander cases. See supra note 56.
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Therefore, the courts would protect these expressions by the Bank of Boston and
Consolidated Edison fully under the first amendment.
Alternatively, National Commission on Egg Nutrition's claim concerning cholesterol
and eggs, 165
 and Youngs Drugs' information on venereal disease'' exemplify factual
statements. Courts should not prohibit factual statements unless they are false or mis-
leading, and the advertiser had reason to know they are false or misleading. In order
to determine whether the advertiser should have known that an advertisement was false
or misleading courts can consider the relationship between the advertiser and the product
discussed. Thus, regulations could prohibit the statements by NCEN and Reynolds
because courts may assume that, due to the relationship between the advertiser and the
product discussed, the advertiser should have known that the statements were false and
likely to deceive, if, in fact, the statements were deceptive.
In sum, under the proposed framework, states may prohibit entirely false or mis-
leading issue advertisements. Courts should strictly scrutinize, however, state regulations
of issue advertisements that are true or contain matters of opinion. This framework
would prevent advertisers from using issue advertisements to make false statements that
they could not make otherwise, and would also prevent government from censoring
unduly an advertiser's viewpoint.
CONCLUSION
To date, courts have struggled to place issue advertising into one of two pre-existing
categories: core first amendment speech or commercial speech. Courts strictly scrutinize
any regulations of core first amendment speech — speech which relates to matters of
public importance or current debate. Thus, a state may regulate such speech only if it
shows a compelling state interest, and if the means used are the least restrictive available.
Courts accord commercial speech regulations only an intermediate level of scrutiny.
Thus, a state may regulate commercial speech if the advertisement is false or deceptive,
or if the state shows a substantial interest in the regulation.
Courts have attempted to squeeze issue advertising into a pre-existing category with
no principles or criteria guiding the decision. Rather than attempt to label issue adver-
tising "commercial" or "core first amendment" speech, this note has examined the reasons
courts strictly scrutinize regulations of core first amendment speech, as well as the reasons
they have granted commercial speech less protection. Because of the value of the ad-
vertiser's viewpoint to the listener, the proposed framework would not permit state
regulation of true factual statements or statements of opinion absent a compelling state
interest. Where, however, the statement is false or misleading the government may
prohibit it entirely because of the advertiser's presumed familiarity with the product.
This framework would thus prevent states from banning issue advertisements merely
because they disagree with the content. In addition, this framework also recognizes that
advertisers may try to use issue advertisements to make false statements which may
otherwise be prohibited if phrased as a product advertisement. This framework preserves
' 61
 National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 821 (1978).
16




the state's interest in the clean flow of commercial information by allowing states to
prohibit knowingly false or deceptive statements made by advertisers regardless of the
format advertisers use. Advertisers could not spread false statements under the guise of
an editorial and government could not regulate otherwise protected speech merely
because it disagrees with the content.
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